Some (big) mail senders do use TLS SNI for SMTP even without DANE
TLS SNI (Server Name Indication) is a modern TLS feature where clients that are establishing a TLS session with a server tell it what name they are connecting to, so the server can give them the right TLS server certificate. TLS SNI is essential for the modern web's widespread HTTPS hosting, and so every usable HTTPS-capable web client uses SNI. However, other protocols also use TLS, and whether or not the software involved uses SNI is much more variable.
DANE is a way to bind TLS certificates to domain names through DNS and DNSSEC. In particular it can be used to authenticate the SMTP connections used to deliver email (RFC 7672). When you use DANE with TLS over SMTP, using SNI is required and is also straightforward, because DNSSEC and DANE have told you (the software trying to deliver email over SMTP) what server name to use.
Recently, SNI came up on the Exim mailing list, where I learned that when it's sending email, Exim doesn't normally use SNI when establishing TLS over SMTP (unless it's using DANE). According to Exim developers on the mailing list, the reasons for this include not being sure of what TLS SNI name to use and uncertainties over whether SMTP servers would malfunction if given SNI information. This caused me to go look at our (Exim) logs for our incoming mail gateway, where I noticed that although we don't use DANE and don't have DNSSEC, a number of organizations sending email to us were using SNI when they established their TLS sessions (helpfully, Exim logs this information). In fact, the SNI information logged is more interesting than I expected.
We have a straightforward inbound mail situation; our domains have a single DNS MX record to a specific host name that has a direct DNS A record (IP address). Despite that, a small number of senders supplied wild SNI names of 'dummy' (which look like mostly spammers), a RFC 1918 IP address (a sendnode.com host), and the IP address of the inbound mail gateway (from barracuda.com). However, most sending mailers that used SNI at all provided our inbound mail gateway's host name as the SNI name.
Using yesterday's logs because it's easy, roughly 40% of the accepted messages were sent using SNI; a better number is that about 46% of the messages that used TLS at all were using SNI (roughly 84% of the accepted incoming messages used TLS). One reason the percentage of SNI is so high is that a lot of the SNI sources are large, well known organizations (often ones with a lot invested in email), including amazonses.com, outlook.com, google.com, quora.com, uber.com, mimecast.com, statuspage.io, sendgrid.net, and mailgun.net.
Given this list of organizations that are willing to use SNI when talking to what is effectively a random server on the Internet with nothing particularly special about its DNS setup, my assumption is that today, sending SNI when you set up TLS over SMTP doesn't hurt delivery very much. At the same time, that some people's software send bogus values suggests that fumbling the SNI name doesn't do too much harm, which is often unlike the situation with HTTPS.
PS: I suspect that the software setting 'dummy' as the SNI name isn't actually mail software, but is instead some dedicated spam sending software that's using a TLS library that has a default SNI name set and is (of course) not overriding the name, much as some web spider software doesn't specifically set the HTTP User-Agent and so inherits whatever vague User-Agent their HTTP library defaults to.
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