Illustrating the tradeoff of security versus usability
One of the sessions of the university's yearly technical conference that I went to today was on two-factor authentication using USB crypto tokens (augmented by software on the client). In the talk, it came up that token-aware software can notice when the USB token is removed and do things like de-authenticate you or break a VPN connection. It struck me that this creates a perfect illustration of the tradeoff between security and usability, which I will frame through a question:
When the screen locker activates, should a token-aware application break its authenticated connection to whatever it's talking to and deauthenticate the user, forcing them to reauthenticate by re-entering their token PIN when they come back to the machine? This is clearly the most secure option; otherwise there's no proof that the person who unlocked the screen and is now using the computer is the person who owns the USB token and passed the two-factor authentication earlier.
Some people are enthusiastically saying 'yes' right now. Now, imagine that you're using this two-factor system to authenticate your SSH connections to your servers. Does your opinion change? In fact, does your opinion change about how the system should behave if the token is removed?
The usability issue is pretty simple: tearing down VPNs and breaking SSH
sessions and logging you out of applications is secure but disruptive.
In some situations it would be actively dangerous, because you'd be
interrupting something halfway through an operation (although in this
sort of environment all sysadmins would rapidly start using
tmux everywhere in self defense). You probably don't want this
disruption every time you step away from your machine to go to the
office coffee pot, the washroom, or whatever. At the same time you don't
want to leave your machine exposed with its screen unlocked.
(In fact the most secure thing to do would be to both lock your screen and take the USB crypto token with you. This is also likely to be maximally disruptive.)
It's worth noting that the more you use your USB token, the more disruptive this is. This is especially punishing to the power users who run authenticated applications all the time and who often or always have multiple ones active at once, possibly with complex state (such as sysadmins with SSH sessions). Unfortunately these may be exactly the people you want to be most secure.
It's tempting to say that way to improve this situation is to improve the usability by suspending secured sessions instead of breaking them and deauthenticating the user; then users merely have to re-enter their PIN (hopefully only once) instead of re-opening all their secured applications and re-establishing their VPN and SSH connections and so on. In theory you can make this work. In practice, doing this securely requires that the server side of everything supports the equivalent of screen, letting you disconnect and later reconnect.
(If the suspension is done only by client software bad guys can use various physical attacks to compromise an exposed machine, bypass the client suspension, and directly use the established VPN, SSH session, or whatever. You need the server software to force the client to re-authenticate.)
PS: I suspect that you can predict the result of having the screen locker activating causing sessions to be broken and people to be deauthenticated. For that matter, you can likely predict the result of having this happen when the USB token is removed (and it involves a surprising number of unattended USB tokens, especially in areas that people feel are physically secure (like lockable single-person offices)).