What usually identifies an intermediate or root TLS certificate
The usual way of describing TLS certificates for things like websites is that they are a chain of trust, where your website's TLS certificate is signed by a Certificate Authority's current intermediate certificate and then that intermediate certificate is signed by the CA's root certificate. For example, you can read about Let's Encrypt's chain of certificates. Some CAs use a chain of multiple intermediate certificates.
(Modern TLS certificates often include a URL to fetch their parent certificate, as covered here.)
But this raises a question, namely how a TLS certificate specifies what its parent certificate is (the certificate that signed it). Until recently, if you had asked me and I had answered off the cuff, I would have guessed that it was based on something like the cryptographic hash of the parent certificate. As it turns out, this is not how it works; instead, as you can find out from actually looking at a certificate, the parent certificate's identity is given by providing its X.509 Subject Name attribute, which identifies both the organization and the intermediate or root certificate's Common Name attribute.
(Okay, there are also Key Identifiers, see here and here. It appears that Key Identifiers are normally exactly that, which is to say that they identify the public key used, not the certificate as such.)
There are some interesting consequences of this that I didn't fully realize or think about before recently. The first is what Let's Encrypt does, which is that it has two versions of its intermediate certificate, one signed by its own root certificate and one signed by IdenTrust. Since they have the same Subject (including Common Name), TLS certificate validation by browsers and other things will accept either. If you inspect the current two Let's Encrypt X3 certificates, you'll find that they also have slightly different key validity periods, presumably because the one signed by the LE root was signed later (about seven months, if we go from the not-before date).
The second is that you can take an existing intermediate certificate and re-issue and re-sign it with new validity dates (and perhaps other modifications to certificate metadata) but the same keypair, the same Subject and Common Name, and so on. This new version of the intermediate certificate can be transparently substituted for the old version because everything that identifies it matches. However, it absolutely must re-use the same public key, because that's the only way to have existing signatures verify correctly.
(This is similar to how in the old days of manual TLS certificate renewal, you could re-use your existing keypair in your new CSR if you wanted to, although it wasn't the recommended practice.)
(See also how TLS certificates specify the hosts they're for which covers server certificates and talks more about X.509 Subject Names.)
PS: Re-signing a certificate this way doesn't require access to its private key, so I believe that if you wanted to, you could re-sign someone else's intermediate certificate with your own CA. I can imagine some potential uses of this under sufficiently weird circumstances, since this would create a setup where with the right certificate chain a single TLS certificate would validate against both a public CA and your internal CA.