TLS certificates were (almost) never particularly well verified
Recently there was a little commotion in the TLS world, as discussed in We Spent $20 To Achieve RCE And Accidentally Became The Admins Of .MOBI. As part of this adventure, the authors of the article discovered that some TLS certificate authorities were using WHOIS information to validate who controlled a domain (so if you could take over a WHOIS server for a TLD, you could direct domain validation to wherever you wanted). This then got some people to realize that TLS Certificate Authorities were not actually doing very much to verify who owned and controlled a domain. I'm sure that there were also some people who yearned for a hypothetical old days when Certificate Authorities actually did that, as opposed to the modern days when they don't.
I'm afraid I have bad news for anyone with this yearning. Certificate Authorities have never done a particularly strong job of verifying who was asking for a TLS (then SSL) certificate. I will go further and be more controversial; we don't want them to be thorough about identity verification for TLS certificates.
There are a number of problems with identity verification in theory and in practice, but one of them is that it's expensive, and the more thorough and careful the identity verification, the more expensive it is. No Certificate Authority is in a position to absorb this expense, so a world where TLS certificates are carefully verified is also a world where they are expensive. It's also probably a world where they're difficult or impossible to obtain from a Certificate Authority that's not in your country, because the difficulty of identity verification goes up significantly in that case.
(One reason that thorough and careful verification is expensive is that it takes significant time from experienced, alert humans, and that time is not cheap.)
This isn't the world that we had even before Let's Encrypt created the ACME protocol for automated domain verifications. The pre-LE world might have started out with quite expensive TLS certificates, but it shifted fairly rapidly to ones that cost only $100 US or less, which is a price that doesn't cover very much human verification effort. And in that world, with minimal human involvement, WHOIS information is probably one of the better ways of doing such verification.
(Such a world was also one without a lot of top level domains, and most of the TLDs were country code TLDs. The turnover in WHOIS servers was probably a lot smaller back then.)
PS: The good news is that using WHOIS information for domain verification is probably on the way out, although how soon this will happen is an open question.
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