Modern TLS has no place left for old things, especially clients
The TLS news of the recent time interval is the expiration of Let's Encrypt's R3 intermediate certificate and then the DST Root CA X3 certificate (for background, see Let's Encrypt's blog entry or Scott Helme). There were a variety of issues that came up (ZDNet, Scott Helme), but one common thread across many of them is that they involved old things. Old operating systems (such as old versions of macOS), old code, old middleware interceptor boxes, and so on. Although the specific details are always surprising, the general trend should not be, because it's been clear for some time that modern TLS is unfriendly to old things.
(Before this it's been the turn of old, historical browsers and old web servers.)
The modern TLS world is full of changes. Old root certificates are expiring and new ones are being introduced to replace them. Old code for certificate validation was never exposed to multiple chains, some with now invalid certificates, and either doesn't implement handling for it or has bugs in that code. Old TLS ciphers and versions are being deprecated and new ones introduced, as the TLS world moves to TLS 1.3 now and some version in the future. Not only does nothing stand still, with new things being added, but the old things don't keep working; they break or get turned off.
Some of this will be better in the future. For example, since it's happened already and will again, actively maintained TLS client code will increasingly deal properly with multiple certificate chains where some of them are expired or otherwise invalid. TLS 1.3 has some mechanisms to force client and server code to better cope with strange new things (such as seeing TLS extensions offered that you don't know about), and so we can expect fewer explosions in the future in clients, servers, and middleware systems. But other things can't be made correct now and then left alone for years. The set of root certificates you need is going to change, and someday there will be a TLS 1.4 that will become required. Nothing will help old things then.
(And probably we will discover new bugs and issues in old TLS code when other changes happen in the future, since we always have so far.)
Regardless of what one things about this situation with modern TLS, it exists (as demonstrated recently in the Let's Encrypt related issues). TLS things that are old today are going to be less and less functional over time; TLS things that are current now but stop being updated will also be less functional over time, but it will take longer for it to really happen. And there's no real prospect of this changing any time soon.
(Some of this is ideological on the part of the people involved in TLS development. They feel strongly that TLS was frozen for too long, to the detriment of its security, and that this should not be allowed to happen in the future.)