Practical security and automatic updates
One of the most important contributors to practical, real world security is automatically applied updates. This is because most people will not take action to apply security fixes; in fact most people will probably not do so even if asked directly and just required to click 'yes, go ahead'. The more work people have to go through to apply security fixes, the fewer people will do so. Ergo you maximize security fixes when people are required to take no action at all.
(Please note that sysadmins and developers are highly atypical users.)
But this relies on users being willing to automatically apply updates, and that in turn requires that updates must be harmless. The ideal update either changes nothing besides fixing security issues and other bugs or improves the user's life. Updates that complicate the user's life at the same time that they deliver security fixes, like Firefox updates, are relatively bad. Updates that actually harm the user's system are terrible.
Every update that does harm to someone's system is another impetus for people to disable automatic updates. It doesn't matter that most updates are harmless and it doesn't matter that most people aren't affected by even the harmful updates, because bad news is much more powerful than good news. We hear loudly about every update that has problems; we very rarely hear about updates that prevented problems, partly because it's hard to notice when it happens.
(The other really important thing to understand is that mythology is extremely powerful and extremely hard to dislodge. Once mythology has set in that leaving automatic updates on is a good way to get screwed, you have basically lost; you can expect to spend huge amounts of time and effort persuading people otherwise.)
If accidentally harmful updates are bad, actively malicious updates are worse. An automatic update system that allows malicious updates (whether the maliciousness is the removal of features or something worse) is one that destroys trust in it and therefor destroys practical security. As a result, malicious updates demand an extremely strong and immediate response. Sadly they often don't receive one, and especially when the 'update' removes features it's often even defended as a perfectly okay thing. It's not.
PS: corollaries for, say, Firefox and Chrome updates are left as an exercise to the reader. Bear in mind that for many people their web browser is one of the most crucial parts of their computer.
(This issue is why people are so angry about FTDI's malicious driver appearing in Windows Update (and FTDI has not retracted their actions; they promise future driver updates that are almost as malicious as this one). It's also part of why I get so angry when Unix vendors fumble updates.)