Mixed feelings about Firefox Addons' new non-Recommended extensions warning
I don't look at addons on addons.mozilla.org very often, so I didn't know until now that Mozilla has started showing a warning on the page for many addons, such as Textern (currently), to the effect, well, let me just quote what I see now (more or less):
[! icon] This is not monitored for security through Mozilla's Recommended Extensions program. Make sure you trust it before installing.
(Textern is among the Firefox addons that I use.)
On the one hand, I can see why Mozilla is doing this. Even in their more limited WebExtensions form, Firefox addons can do a great deal of damage to the security and privacy of the people who use them, and Mozilla doesn't have the people (or the interest) to audit them all or keep a close eye on what they're doing. Firefox addons aren't quite the prominent target that Chrome addons are, but things like the "Stylish" explosion demonstrates that people are happy to target Firefox too. What happened with Stylish also fairly convincingly demonstrates that requiring people to approve addon permissions isn't useful in practice, for various reasons.
On the other hand, this is inevitably going to lead to two bad outcomes. First, some number of people will be scared away from perfectly fine addons that simply aren't popular enough for Mozilla to bring them into the Recommended Extensions program. The second order consequence is that getting people to use a better version of an existing addon has implicitly gotten harder if the existing addon is a 'Recommended Extension'; yours may be better, but it also has a potentially scary warning on it.
(Arguably this is the correct outcome from a security perspective; yours may be better, but it's not necessarily enough better to make up for the increased risk of it not being more carefully watched.)
Second, some number of people will now be trained to ignore another security related warning because in practice it's useless noise to them. I think that this is especially likely if they've been directly steered to an addon by a recommendation or plug from somewhere else, and aren't just searching around on AMO. If you're searching on AMO for an addon that does X, the warning may steer you to one addon over another or sell you on the idea that the risk is too high. If you've come to AMO to install specific addon Y because it sounds interesting, well, the warning is mostly noise; it is a 'do you want to do this thing you want to do' question, except it's not even a question.
(And we know how those questions get answered; people almost always say 'yes I actually do want to do the thing I want to do'.)
Unfortunately I think this is a case where there is no good answer. Mozilla can't feasibly audit everything, they can't restrict AMO to only Recommended Extensions, and they likely feel that they can't just do nothing because of the harms to people who use Firefox Addons, especially people who don't already understand the risks that addons present.
The modern HTTPS world has no place for old web servers
When I ran into Firefox's interstitial warning for old TLS versions, it wasn't where I expected, and where it happened gave me some tangled feelings. I had expected to first run into this on some ancient appliance or IPMI web interface (both of which are famous for this sort of thing). Instead, it was on the website of an active person that had been mentioned in a recent comment here on Wandering Thoughts. On the one hand, this is a situation where they could have kept their web server up to date. On the other hand, this demonstrates (and brings home) that the modern HTTPS web actively requires you to keep your web server up to date in a way that the HTTP web didn't. In the era of HTTP, you could have set up a web server in 2000 and it could still be running today, working perfectly well (even if it didn't support the very latest shiny thing). This doesn't work for HTTPS, not today and not in the future.
In practice there are a lot of things that have to be maintained on a HTTPS server. First, you have to renew TLS certificates, or automate it (in practice you've probably had to change how you get TLS certificates several times). Even with automated renewals, Let's Encrypt has changed their protocol once already, deprecating old clients and thus old configurations, and will probably do that again someday. And now you have to keep reasonably up to date with web server software, TLS libraries, and TLS configurations on an ongoing basis, because I doubt that the deprecation of everything before TLS 1.2 will be the last such deprecation.
I can't help but feel that there is something lost with this. The HTTPS web probably won't be a place where you can preserve old web servers, for example, the way the HTTP web is. Today if you have operating hardware you could run a HTTP web server from an old SGI Irix workstation or even a DEC Ultrix machine, and every browser would probably be happy to speak HTTP 1.0 or the like to it, even though the server software probably hasn't been updated since the 1990s. That's not going to be possible on the HTTPS web, no matter how meticulously you maintain old environments.
Another, more relevant side of this is that it's not going to be possible for people with web servers to just let them sit. The more the HTTPS world changes and requires you to change, the more your HTTPS web server requires ongoing work. If you ignore it and skip that work, what happens to your website is the interstitial warning that I experienced and eventually it will stop being accepted by browsers at all. I expect that this is going to drive more people into the arms of large operations (like Github Pages or Cloudflare) that will look after all of that for them, and a little bit more of the indie 'anyone can do this' spirit of the old web will fade away.
(At the same time this is necessary to keep HTTPS secure, and HTTPS itself is necessary for the usual reasons. But let's not pretend that nothing is being lost in this shift.)