Chris's Wiki :: blog/web/OCSPStaplingMaybeNot Commentshttps://utcc.utoronto.ca/~cks/space/blog/web/OCSPStaplingMaybeNot?atomcommentsDWiki2020-01-14T14:23:58ZRecent comments in Chris's Wiki :: blog/web/OCSPStaplingMaybeNot.By sam on /blog/web/OCSPStaplingMaybeNottag:CSpace:blog/web/OCSPStaplingMaybeNot:1d4e9914bb45da5dd16c391a2e8d2e3b1caec5e5sam<div class="wikitext"><p>I reached much the same conclusion on OCSP stapling after looking into it - too many moving parts and rough edges for not enough gain. An attacker who's able to get a certificate can presumably also immediately get an OCSP response to staple to it, so they have a few days to exploit the misissuance anyway.</p>
<p>Firefox is experimenting with a different revocation mechanism, CRLite, which takes advantage of Certificate Transparency providing a list of all domains on the public web and then creating a (relatively) really small collection of alternating inclusion-exclusion Bloom filters to exactly describe the revoked set. It's not deployed yet, but the idea makes sense to me, and once it's turned on (and once Let's Encrypt starts publishing a CRL) I'll benefit from at-least-as-prompt-as-OCSP revocations without any further work on my end, or having to care about OCSP server uptime or any other new operational worries.</p>
</div>2020-01-14T14:23:58Z